Hjalmar J. Procopé. Questioning and Reconciling Interpretations of European Integration History

Finland was very much absent from the early stages of Western European political integration after World War II. In the European Movement and in the Council of Europe, Finland was neither represented by her government or parliamentarians, nor by exiled émigré politicians like the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The only prominent Finn who took an active interest in European affairs was the former foreign minister Hjalmar J. Procopé.

By Richard Brander[1]

Finland is a fairly new member of the European Union (EU). After the end of the Cold War, membership of the EU was accomplished in 1995 alongside Sweden and Austria. Earlier, due to foreign policy constraints, formal participation in the Western European integration process had not been seen as an option. Though heavily dependent on the Soviet Union after World War II, Finland did remain a democratic multi-party state. The country was able to build a functioning relationship to the other Nordic countries and maintained close economic ties to the West in general. It is in fact possible to detect a Finnish pre-integration history going back all the way to 1948, personalised in Hjalmar J. Procopé. Procopé's involvement in the early years of the Western European integration process is rather unknown even in his native Finland.[2]

Hjalmar J. Procopé (1889–1954) was a lawyer who started his political career as a conservative parliamentarian for the Swedish People's party, soon after Finland gained independence in 1917. A fluent speaker of Finnish, Swedish, German, French and English, he was foreign minister from 1924 to 1925, and again from 1927 to 1931. After some years in the private sector Procopé returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as Finnish minister to the United States during World War II. After the war, when the political elite in Finland began to experience a difficult relationship with the Soviet Union, Procopé no longer held any governmental positions. As a fierce anti-communist he was in political offside, and he lived most of the time in Sweden. He was one of very few Finns who at that time took an active interest in European issues. This article will focus on Procopé's connections to and activities within the European Movement in 1948–1949. In particular the genesis and development of Procopé's political ideas on European integration will be scrutinized. Some historiographical reflections are also included.

So far very little research has been done on Hjalmar J. Procopé's "European dimension". Neither historians nor political scientists have showed an interest in this part of Procopé's career. A Ph.D.-dissertation has been written by Magnus Lemberg about Procopé's political activities until 1926 (Lemberg, 1985). The same historian has also written a biography covering the whole life of Procopé (Lemberg, 1989). In the biography, however, very little interest is shown in the European dimensions of Procopé's political life, especially when it comes to the post World War II years. One reason why so little attention has been given to Procopé by historians in his native Finland may be that he did not fit into the big narrative about peaceful cooperation between Finland and the USSR (Turtola, 1985:313-315). During this period, and especially in 1948, the main political activities of the Finnish elite had to do with the Soviet Union. Much historical research has focused on how Finland was able to avoid a communist takeover of the same type as in Czechoslovakia, and on the decisive role played by the president of the republic J.K. Paasikivi (Polvinen, 1999). New research on Procopé regarding Europe in the immediate post-war years could challenge the post-war master narrative about Finland's position, as I will try to show in the following.

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[2] Richard Brander, "Hjalmar J. Procopé as Finnish contact person to the European Movement 1948–1954", Ph.D.-dissertation in progress, University of Helsinki.

However, Procopé may also be viewed within the broader context of historiography on European integration. Though Finland had a *sui generis* position during the Cold War, most Finns were firm believers in a pluralistic multi-party state. Procopé remained a marginal political figure, but to make sense of his attitude towards European integration, it is relevant to look at the first two major debates in this historiography. On the one hand, the idea of creating a European federation was at its strongest in the immediate aftermath of World War II and in this period the federalist approach dominated teaching and thinking about the history of European integration.

The historian Walter Lipgens later tried to give academic credibility to the federalist interpretation of the early steps towards European integration. Lipgens was a federalist himself, and together with other similar-minded historians, he attempted to collect all possible documentary evidence of early European integration (Lipgens and Loth, 1991). Since the 1980's, however, the historian Alan Milward's view of European integration – that it has been driven by national social and economic interests – has dominated the academic field of integration history research (Dinan, 2006; Kaiser, 2005). Some of Milward's thoughts are of special interest here when studying the foundations of the political ideas that sprang up during the early years of European integration. Milward has been highly sceptical towards the hagiographic accounts of the so-called founding fathers of Europe. He has tried to show that "great men" like Adenauer, de Gasperi and Schuman above all sought to promote their countries' interests and found an ideal way of doing so through the process of European integration (Milward, 1992 [2nd 2000]; Dinan, 2006:316). Milward's argument as contrasted to Lipgens more idealistic view of early European integration can be seen an interesting dichotomy in the analysis of the ideas developed by Procopé. In this context, it is also interesting to examine whether Procopé was genuinely devoted to European integration in the federalist sense, or whether he was first and foremost interested in promoting what he saw as the national interest of Finland.

The Political Context of Procopé's Activities

In order to scrutinise Hjalmar J. Procopé's European activities it is useful to recall the difficult situation for the young republic of Finland, after two wars lost to the Soviet Union, first the Winter War in 1939–1940 and then the Continuation War in 1941–1944. There had been a lot of sympathy for Finland in the United States after the Soviet aggression in 1939, a situation that Procopé as minister in Washington used to obtain millions of dollars in funds for the small democratic country in north-eastern Europe fighting for its survival. But when Finland in 1941 allied itself with Nazi Germany, while trying to get back lost territories in the eastern part of the country, support from the United States quickly eroded. Procopé struggled to keep up diplomatic relations to his host country, but in June 1944 the minister and his staff were finally expelled from the United States. As the Soviets in the final phases of the war put their focus on the German front, Finland was able to avoid occupation. But the Allied Control Commission, dominated by the Soviet Union, took Finland under tight command. The democratic institutions remained, but according to the armistice agreement signed in Moscow in September 1944, Finland had to punish the so-called war criminals. In Finland the tribunal was widely seen as illegitimate, although far from everyone had been happy with the *Waffenbrüderschaft* with the Germans. Hjalmar J. Procopé, who was a lawyer by education, acted as lead-defender of the former Prime Minister and President of the Republic, Risto Ryti. The politically motivated tribunal led to a sentence of ten years of prison for Ryti. In the new political situation where Finland despite everything had to build up a working relation to the former enemy in the East, Procopé had big difficulties to adapt. He described his own situation as being in "loyal opposition" to the friendship policy towards the Soviet Union that was personalized by President J.K. Paasikivi.[3]

In 1947, Finland was forced to say no to Marshall Aid which drew a wedge between countries in the West and the East. The Eastern European countries were invited, but they declined to participate after Soviet pressure. In the early spring of 1948 there was a communist coup d'État in Czechoslovakia and there were rumours about a possible coup in Finland as well. During the spring of 1948 Finland was summoned to Moscow for negotiations about a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. The Treaty firmly placed Finland in the Eastern bloc at least when it came to military affairs. In this period, Finland never became a "people's republic" as other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence did. Political contacts with Western Europe were nonetheless very rare. In 1947 Procopé himself saw his country as being under Soviet dominance:"The situation in Finland may be better than in other Russian border states, but still the fact remains that Finland is behind the Iron Curtain, although the curtain has not been drawn completely. Finland's independence is still more nominal than

[3] National Archives of Finland (NARC), Procopé collection, microfilm 6636, letter from Procopé to Rainer von Fieandt, 9.12.1946.

real."[4] This is the political background against which one should place the non-interest of most parts of the Finnish political elite for the debate in continental Europe about new forms of cooperation such as a European federation and other ways of peaceful cooperation between sovereign states.

These developments also formed the background for Procopé's political position after World War II. Procopé himself was not seen positively by Russians or by Finnish communists. Fear for his own safety was therefore one reason why Procopé resided in Stockholm. In March 1948, Valpo – the Finnish secret police that was controlled by the communists – fabricated a list of names with members of a West leaning government that would allegedly seize power in a right-wing conspiracy. Procopé was on the list as foreign minister (Polvinen, 1999:494). Though this conspiracy clearly was created as communist propaganda one can assume that Procopé – and others – saw him as a possible minister in an exile government if the communists would have come to power.

The decisive event that forced Procopé to live in Sweden was however his publication of a book about the war-responsibility trial. In the book, which was published in Sweden, Procopé maintained that the condemned Finnish politicians were innocent (Procopé, 1946). After this incident, both Procopé and others thought it better that he stayed at a location where the Soviets could not reach him so easily. Although being abroad, the mental distance from Stockholm to Helsinki was not that far. The postal system worked without censorship and thus Procopé was able to maintain correspondence with compatriots living in Finland. He also met a lot of Finns visiting the Swedish capital. Taking account of the Soviet hostility to Western European integration activities, Stockholm was in many ways an ideal location for someone who acted as an informal contact person between proponents of European integration and Finland.

The Congress of Europe in The Hague[5]

For Hjalmar J. Procopé "the idea of Europe" after World War II was nothing new. He had known the Austrian count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-Europe Union, already during the 1920s. In 1929, Procopé was invited to become a member of the international honorary committee of the Pan-Europe Union, and it was Procopé who chaired the first board when the union was established in Finland in 1930 (Lemberg, 1989:185).

In the European visions of Coudenhove-Kalergi there was no place for the Soviet Union; a part of Coudenhove-Kalergi's vision of Europe that apparently attracted Procopé. In fact, the threat from the communist Soviet Union was an axiomatic part of Procopé's foreign political thinking already when he was foreign minister. The Soviet threat was the driving force for the building of international relations for the young republic of Finland. Nordic cooperation, the politics towards the League of Nations and contacts to Western Europe could all be seen in this context. Very few idealistic thoughts can be detected in the early visions of Procopé. In a 1930 memorandum on Finnish foreign politics, Procopé was building his analysis on historical, military, economic and political arguments. The Soviet Union – or Russia as Procopé writes – was the only fundamental problem. However, he recognised the importance of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in Russia's security policy and according to the memorandum, Finland should avoid to be seen as an instrument for other powers' potentially aggressive politics towards the East. Still, one reason for cooperation in the League of Nations sphere was, according to Procopé, that it gave a possibility to exchange thoughts with leading statesmen (Lemberg, 1989:155-158). This anti-Russian approach to foreign policy affairs is good to have in mind when contemplating the driving forces behind Procopé's later engagement in the Western European integration process.

After World War II, while living in Stockholm, Procopé took a new interest in European issues. This part of Procopé's career is almost totally neglected by his biographer, Magnus Lemberg. In war-torn Europe, popular support for deeper cooperation between the previous enemies was however substantial. Now out of office, former British prime minister Winston Churchill was one of the main sponsors of the idea of building a united Europe in the first post-war years. Churchill was in fact the most well-known political figure present when the different organisations working for European cooperation came together in May 1948 in the Dutch capital of The Hague to form the European Movement.

Due to the difficult political situation official or even semi-official participation from Finland in the Congress of Europe in The Hague 7 to 10 May 1948 was out of the question. The idea of Procopé participating in a private capacity was first floated by the British parliamentarian

[4] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6640, letter from Procopé to Arthur H. Vandenberg, 16.12.1947.

[5] The most important primary sources in this context remain the Procopé collection (diaries, letters etc.) in the National Archives of Finland (NARC), and the files of the European Movement in the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) in Florence, Italy.

R.W. Mackay during a visit to Stockholm. The invitation was later made in the name of two Scandinavian parliamentarians with great interest in European affairs, namely Karl Wistrand of Sweden and Karl Bøgholm of Denmark.[6]

Procopé pondered for a long time whether he should travel to The Hague or not. In a letter to Sumner Welles, an old friend in the US State Department, Procopé contemplated the pros and cons of participating, emphasising that the Congress:

"… convenes under the auspice of Mr Churchill, and there will be both 'bourgeois' and social democrats representatives from the Western and Northern European countries. I have got a personal invitation to attend the Congress. I represent of course nothing, and my role would be only that of a passive observateur. Owing to my rather delicate situation, as long as I am living on a Swedish foreigner's passport without a definitive permission to come to U.S.A, my going to the Congress is a somewhat delicate matter and could even bring with it some inconveniences. However, I think I shall go, provided I get rid of a rather unpleasant bronchitis, from which I have suffered for some time."[7]

The reference to inconveniences refers to the fact that the Swedish government was not very pleased with Procopé's political activities, as they strained the relationship between Stockholm and Helsinki. And as he at that moment was not able to obtain a Finnish passport, Procopé now hoped for a future in America. His situation however got better after the new government was installed in Helsinki in the summer of 1948.

Weighing pros and cons, Procopé eventually took the decision not to participate in the meeting at The Hague; a decision which he communicated in a letter to Coudenhove-Kalergi. The letter shows how Procopé thought about "Europe" at this time. Procopé recalls his first meeting with Coudenhove-Kalergi 25 years earlier. He regrets that the Pan-European Association in Finland, which he himself had founded in 1930 could not work under the present conditions, namely that "my country having been forced into the Russian sphere of domination and I myself being in some way a refugee. But the world may be assured that the overwhelming majority [in Finland] is anti-communist and 'European'."[8] For Procopé it was rather typical to use the terms anti-communist and European almost as substitutes. This can be seen throughout his activities in the post World War II years until his death in 1954.

The pathos of the former minister was very much in the spirit of Coudenhove-Kalergi, but Procopé's stance was even harder when it came to excluding not only communism but also Russia as a country from Europe. Procopé hardly ever used the name "Soviet Union" but all the time stuck to "Russia". After noting in the letter that Europe had received impulses from many different parts of the world, Procopé continued: "But still it [Europe] is a conception of life and a civilization of its own, completely different from the Russian way of life and the great Eastern civilizations." Thus there was no place for Russia in Procopé's vision of Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi, for his part, thought that the Soviet Union or Russia could have become a member of the Pan-European Union, if the country had turned democratic (Pietikäinen, 1994:157). Procopé very much regretted the division of Europe, but he reckoned that the first task was to consolidate Western Europe. "To build up the part of Europe which is still free, is in itself a great and extremely important thing and I hope the Congress will mark a decisive step forward in this direction". At the same time he stressed that the ultimate goal should be that all countries (except for Russia) should be embraced by the Union of Europe. "I most sincerely hope that this viewpoint will be stressed and that the European nations which are not able to be represented at the Congress will not be forgotten."

In the letter to Coudenhove-Kalergi, Procopé did not elaborate on his own forth-coming absence from The Hague; he just noted that it had been impossible to go "owing to different reasons which would take too long to explain in this letter". Procopé ended up sending a greeting through Coudenhove-Kalergi to the Congress of Europe saying that Finland, although dependent on the Soviet Union especially in its foreign policy, was in good spirit: "… please be assured that the spirit of the Finnish nation, and her wish to remain a democratic people and to belong to the Western world, are unaltered."

As Procopé only cancelled his participation in The Hague at the very last minute, it has wrongly been believed that he was present. According to the official list of participants he was indeed present as an observer.[9] But in a diplomatic report from the Finnish embassy at The Hague to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki it was reported that no Finns were

[6] NARC, Procopé collection, folder 24, Procopé's diary, 29.4.1948.

[7] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6640, letter from Procopé to Sumner Welles, 3.5.1948 Stockholm.

[8] NARC, Procopé collection, folder 90, letter to Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 5.5.1948. The following quotes are from this document.

[9] Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), ME-423, List of observers at the Congress of Europe.

present.[10] In the Procopé collection in the National Archives of Finland, there is also a lot of documentation showing that Procopé was hospitalised in Stockholm at the same time as the Congress was taking place. His bronchitis had developed into pneumonia, but that was not the main reason for him staying in Sweden. In a letter to President Paasikivi later in May, Procopé explained that press reports about him being present in The Hague were false. According to the letter, Procopé had decided not to take part as he did not want to give the communists in Finland any possibilities of using his participation for political purposes.[11]

One has to recall that Finland at that moment was in preparations for the parliamentary elections of the summer 1948, with the explicit aim of many conservatives and social democrats to force the communists out of the centre-left coalition-government. This was achieved when the social democrats formed a minority government after the July elections.

The wish not to provoke the communists might well have been the single most important reason for Procopé's decision not to take part in the Congress of Europe. In early May 1948 President Paasikivi received a memorandum from the British Embassy in Helsinki concerning the tactic used by the Czech communists when they seized power in Prague (Polvinen, 1999:625, footnote 32).[12] One could assume that the same information was also given to Procopé, who then would have decided against doing anything that could be used by the far left in the power struggle in Finland. In a letter after the Congress of Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi expressed his satisfaction to hear from Procopé again "after so many years and to recall the time when we worked together for European Union. At last the seed that we have been sowing is rising. I am extremely satisfied with all this."[13] Coudenhove-Kalergi stated to Procopé after the Congress of Europe had been concluded: "I shall never be satisfied with Western European Union but will continue my campaign until your country and the other nations of Eastern Europe shall be united with the West."[14]

This was probably music for the ears of Procopé who subsequently continued to maintain contacts with leading figures working for European unity. His next possibility to appear at the scene of politics for European unification would come less than a year later. It was after numerous informal consultations with leading Finnish politicians that Procopé decided to participate in the meeting of the International Council of the European Movement in Brussels between 25 and 28 February 1949. At this meeting, the new institutions of the European Movement were inaugurated under the presidency of Churchill and Spaak (Hicks, 1991:523). Afterwards, Procopé was very satisfied with the outcome, and also with the fact that he was able to take part in the deliberations "incognito" without any newspapers reporting about his presence.[15] Maintaining a very low profile when it came to publicity was to be one of Procopé's main lines regarding his meetings in the context of the European Movement. Reading the archival evidence from multiple sources, one gets the impression that Procopé was more than happy to be regarded as an important person in the sphere of enthusiasts for the European cause. Name-dropping was one way of showing that he still possessed a reasonable amount of political and social capital. There was indeed a lot of name-dropping when Procopé wrote to Sumner Welles about the outcome of the Brussels meeting, Procopé mentioning that he had met with Churchill, Spaak, Schuman, Bidault and others.[16]

During 1949, Procopé had a vivid correspondence with Joseph Retinger, the general secretary of the European Movement. It was considered impossible for Finland to become a member state of the Council of Europe, and even the founding of a national Finnish committee of the European Movement was ruled out. This left a role to Procopé that he apparently did not mind to play. In a letter to Retinger, after a visit that Procopé made to Finland, one notes how heavily he identified himself with the European project: "I found much sympathy for our Movement, but also that in the present political circumstances people do not think it possible to take up active work in the country. On the other hand they expressed their satisfaction of the contact I have had and might have [in the future] with the Movement."[17]

Later in 1949, Procopé thought it could be possible to establish an informal national Finnish committee. He

[10] Archives of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, Euroopan Liitto 7D2, telegram nr 68 from the Finnish representation in The Hague, 10.5.1948 and the report *Maanosanparantajat koolla* from the same source, 9.5.1948.
[11] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6639, letter from Procopé to Paasikivi, 16.5.1948.
[12] The memorandum was received by Paasikivi 3.5.1948.
[13]NARC, Procopé collection, folder 90, letter to Procopé from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 7.6.1948.
[14] Ibid.
[15] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6640, letter from Procopé to Väinö Tanner, spring 1949 (undated).
[16] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6641, letter from Procopé to Sumner Welles, 6.4.1949.
[17] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6639, letter from Procopé to Joseph Retinger, 13.6.1949.

communicated this idea in a letter to Duncan Sandys, the president of the European Movement:

"Some really interested people in Finland would together with me found an unofficial European Council which would not openly work in the country but which would be a nucleus of the [European] interests and which would join your organisation in London and have its representatives take part in your work. The men with whom I have discussed this proposal were very enthusiastic. However, before going further and investigating more closely the possibilities in Finland, I would like to know what you, Mr. Sandys, and other of your leading people think of this plan."[18]

It is noteworthy that Procopé, when in contact with leading proponents of European integration, spoke the same 'language' as they did, and that he appeared to be as interested in federal visions for Europe as they were. In a letter to the chairman of the European Movement in France, René Courtin, he explained that the Finnish unwillingness to found a national committee did not imply a lack of interest: "Tout au contraire, il y a des adhérents fervents pour lesquelles l'ideal est un Etat fédéral auquel on voudrait un jour pouvoir adhérer"[19]. To the American Sumner Welles, however, who apparently was not interested in the fine print of the integration project, Procopé wrote: "It is also possible that in May I go to Copenhagen for a quite informal and private meeting of some enthusiasts for the unity of Europe." [20] One therefore gets the impression that Procopé in the latter context tries to play down his own eagerness a little, by distancing himself from the "enthusiasts".

Apparently Procopé felt that his activities in the European Movement were very meaningful, and it gave him deep satisfaction to take part in them. Procopé was positioned at the political margin in his native Finland, but when it came to the early European integration process, he was able to play a constructive role together with prominent figures on the Western European scene. His language skills, his pre-war contacts and fierce anti-communism made him an ideal contact person between Finland and the European Movement. He seems to have genuinely believed in the ideas of trying to foster more cooperation and integration – or even unification – between the countries and peoples of Europe. Economic and political integration were good things as such for Western Europe, he believed, and the best way to fight communism. From the European Movement's perspective Procopé, though a conservative, was a good portal figure because he had good contacts to social democrats. The European Movement had a clear idea that it wanted to be a broad forum for all anti-communists working for European Union. And finally, Procopé's old contacts to the US administration were of importance as the Americans gradually became key sponsors of European integration in general and of the European Movement in particular (Aldrich, 1995).

There seems to have been a certain degree of support for Procopé's pro-European positioning from President J.K. Paasikivi and other leading figures of the new political establishment in Finland. However, at least on one occasion was Procopé directly reprimanded by foreign minister Sakari Tuomioja for these activities. Tuomioja reminded his one-time predecessor that Finns had to show a common front when it came to foreign policy matters. Procopé defended himself by saying that he had already during the inter-war years worked for the idea of Europe, and that his present engagement was conducted in a private capacity.[21]

The French minister to Finland, Jacques Lecompte-Boinet, once remarked that Hjalmar J. Procopé was "the only person in Finland who thinks internationally and has an interest in international issues".[22] This seems very much to have been the case. During the late 1940's and the early 1950's the Finnish political elite was focused on the bilateral relations with the mighty Eastern neighbour. Only Procopé was "international" in the sense that his main interest was in European affairs and in the idea of European unity.

Concluding remarks

The aim of this article has been to examine the genesis and development of Procopé's ideas on European integration. One can detect a long line in the thinking of Procopé: for him the idea of Europe was very much a question of opposition to Russia in general and to communist Soviet Union specifically. The perennial threat to his native Finland came from the East, and this perceived danger overshadowed all other considerations.

From a historiographical point of view, very little attention has been given to the involvement of Procopé in the European Movement in the post World War II years. The grand narrative of Finnish history writing

[18] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6639, letter from Procopé to Duncan Sandys, 7.11.1949.

[19] "On the contrary, there are fervent supporters of an ideal with a federal state, which one hopes to be able to belong to one day [in the future]." (My translation RB)

[20] NARC, Procopé collection, microfilm 6639, letter from Procopé to Sumner Welles, 2.5.1949.

[21] NARC, Procopé collection, folder 24, Procopé's diary, 19.6.1952.

[22] As told by René Courtin to Procopé, NARC, Procopé collection, folder 24, Procopé's diary, 3.5.1952.

has focused on the achievement that Finland as the only neighbouring country to the USSR was able to maintain both her independence and her democratic institutions. The post-World War II friendship policy personalised in the presidents J.K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen is still canonized in the sense that "dissidents" like Procopé do not fit easily into the mainstream history writing of the years 1944 to1991. Finland was very much an anomaly during the Cold War belonging neither to the West nor to the East.

In the European Movement and in the Council of Europe of the late 1940's and early 1950, Finland was neither represented by her government or by parliamentarians, nor was she represented by exiled émigré politicians like the countries that were behind the Iron Curtain. In this sense Finland was more absent than almost any other European country from the early political Western European integration process. Procopé was the only member or former member of the Finnish political elite who from time to time was present, and he was happy to be able to participate in meetings and events without any publicity. Extended media coverage could have damaged the sensitive Finnish-Soviet relationship if Procopé - rightly or wrongly - would have been seen by the Soviets as having some kind of semi-official mandate.

The empirical part of this article tends to lend support to the European integration perspective taken by the historian Alan Milward. The idea of Europe as developed by Procopé was primarily about the national security interests of his native Finland. According to Milward, the national social and economic interests of the countries of the geographical Western Europe were the driving force behind the integration process. This cannot as such be applied to Finland and Procopé who was primarily concerned with national security, but the basis is still the same: integration as a means of promoting some form of primordial 'national interest'.

However, in a sense Procopé also fits well into the federalist narrative of Walter Lipgens. Procopé considered himself to be a federalist, but one can detect a variance in the expressions of the ideas depending on the audience. In the company of persons such as Paul-Henri Spaak or René Courtin, he was as much a federalist as they were. In contacts with leading Scandinavians with an interest in Europe, like Karl Wistrand of Sweden or Ole Bjørn Kraft or Denmark, he was influenced by their visions about European cooperation. The rhetoric of Procopé was again different when it came to communication with Soviet-focused Finns, or with Americans like Sumner Welles who had limited interest in the details of European institution building. Nevertheless, "federalism" was not an empty expression for Procopé. He was fully aware of the legal and political content of the concept.

Viewed from this perspective, the two explanations offered by Milward and Lipgens are not mutually exclusive, but rather supplement each other. Evidence shows that Procopé was worried about the fate of Finland. And while being idealistically pro-European, he also remained a type of political realist in the sense that he always contemplated the effects of his activities on the political situation for his native country. Procopé was very much a European, but it also seems that he first of all considered himself a patriotic Finn. Meanwhile his life story – the role of personal ambition, reputation and sense of meaning – also influenced his activities. The involvement with the European Movement was a possibility for Procopé to use and maintain his old contacts and his experience as a politician and a diplomat to play a constructive role in post-war Europe. It probably gave him a sense of excitement to use his international contacts at a time when he was politically marginalized in Finland. More generally, this suggests that it may be worthwhile to include the particular, personal micro perspective when explaining European integration.

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